There is usually a lot to unpack in a decision today by the Director of National Intelligence to declassify (with redactions) a 2018 FISA court ruling about ongoing unauthorized database search queries by FBI agents/”contractors” inside the period covering 2017/2018.
BACKGROUND: In April 2017 the DNI released a FISA report written by Presiding Judge Rosemary Collery in which showed massive abuse, via unauthorized searches of the NSA database, inside the period of November 2015 through May 2016. Judge Collyer’s report specifically identified search query increases tied to the 2016 presidential primary. Two years of research identified in which process as the DOJ/FBI and also also also IC using the NSA database to query information related to political candidates, specifically Donald Trump.
at in which point we fast-forward to Judge Boasberg in a similar review (full pdf below), looking at the time-period of 2017 through March 2018.
The timing here is usually an important aspect.
the idea is usually within in which time-period where ongoing DOJ and also also also FBI activity transfers through the Obama administration (Collyer report) into the Trump administration (Boasberg report).
the idea cannot be overemphasized as you read the Boasberg opinion, or any reporting on the Boasberg opinion, in which officials within DOJ and also also also FBI are/were on a continuum. Meaning the “modest group” activity didn’t stop after the election yet rather continued with the Mueller and also also also Weissmann impeachment agenda.
Remember, the 2016 ‘insurance policy’ was to hand Mueller the 2016 FBI investigation so they could turn the idea into the 2017 special counsel investigation. Mueller, Weissmann and also also also the group then used the ‘Steele Dossier’ as the cornerstone for the special counsel review. The goal of the Mueller investigation was to construct impeachment via obstruction. The same players transferred through “crossfire hurricane” into the Mueller ‘obstruction‘ plan.
Within Judge Boasberg’s review of the 2017 activity he outlines an identical set of FISA violations through within the FBI units and also also also “contractors” as initially outlined by Judge Collyer a year earlier. Judge Boasberg wrote his opinion in October 2018 and also also also in which opinion was declassified today (October 8th, 2019). Boasberg is usually reviewing 2017 through March 2018. [Main Link to All Legal Proceedings Here]
(Via Wall Street Journal) The intelligence community disclosed Tuesday in which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court last year found in which the FBI’s pursuit of data about Americans ensnared in a warrantless internet-surveillance program intended to target foreign suspects may have violated the law authorizing the program, as well as the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches.
The court concluded in which the FBI had been improperly searching a database of raw intelligence for information on Americans—raising concerns about oversight of the program, which as a spy program operates in near total secrecy.
[…] The court ruling identifies tens of thousands of improper searches of raw intelligence databases by the bureau in 2017 and also also also 2018 in which the idea deemed improper in part because they involved data related to tens of thousands of emails or telephone numbers—in one case, suggesting in which the FBI was using the intelligence information to vet its personnel and also also also cooperating sources. Federal law requires in which the database only be searched by the FBI as part of seeking evidence of a crime or for foreign intelligence information.
In different cases, the court ruling reveals improper use of the database by individuals. In one case, an FBI contractor ran a query of an intelligence database—searching information on himself, different FBI personnel and also also also his relatives, the court revealed. (more)
As with the Collyer report I am going line-by-painstaking-line through the Boasberg report (yeah, swamped); and also also also what is usually clear is usually in which in 2017 the FBI ‘bad actors’ and also also also ‘contractors’ were continuing to try and also also also subvert the safeguards put into place by former NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers. The 2017 non-compliance rate is usually similar to the 2016 review.
Judge Boasberg touches on the April 2017 Judge Collyer report. Here is usually the carefully worded DNI explanation of the connective tissue (emphasis mine):
[…] The FISC also concluded in which the FBI’s querying and also also also minimization procedures, as implemented, were inconsistent with Section 702 and also also also the Fourth Amendment, in light of certain identified compliance incidents involving queries of Section 702 information.
These incidents involved instances in which personnel either misapplied or misunderstood the query standard, such in which the queries were not reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. Some of these instances involved queries concerning large numbers of individuals.
While stating in which the Government had taken “constructive steps” to address the identified issues, the FISC held in which these steps did not fully address the statutory and also also also Fourth Amendment concerns raised by the compliance incidents.
[…] Additionally, the FISC considered the scope of certain fresh restrictions regarding “abouts” communications in which were enacted inside the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. “Abouts” collection is usually the acquisition of communications in which contain a reference to, yet are not to or through, a Section 702 target. As the NSA explained in April 2017 (see NSA’s April 28, 2017 Statement), the NSA stopped acquiring any upstream internet communications in which are solely “about” a foreign intelligence target and also also also, instead, limited its Section 702 collection to only those communications in which are directly “to” or “through” a foreign intelligence target.
NSA’s 2018 Targeting Procedures contained the same limitation. Although the Government did not seek to resume “abouts” collection, the FISC, with assistance through amici, reviewed whether the “abouts” restrictions applied to any different types of Section 702 acquisitions currently being conducted. While the FISC held in which the “abouts” restrictions apply across Section 702 acquisitions, the idea found in which current Section 702 acquisitions did not implicate the “abouts” restrictions. (read more)
Here is usually the October 2018 Boasberg Opinion:
[Direct pdf Link]
As with the 2017 Collyer report, the idea will take us some time to review the background material to ensure we can see behind the DNI redactions. However, at in which point I see no reason to believe the Boasberg outline will be substantially different through the Collyer report; rather an initial review indicates the FBI bad actors just modified their approach, yet kept doing political surveillance.
Unfortunately, what appears to be present within the Boasberg report, is usually in which FBI personnel and also also also ‘contractors’ were engaged in activity directly related to a continuation of efforts in 2017. in which concern becomes more troublesome when you consider the Mueller operation in which was happening at the same time. REMINDER through the Mueller Report: